Deception is common in nature and humans are no exception 1 . Modern societies have created institutions to control cheating, but many situations remain where only intrinsic honesty keeps people from cheating and violating rules. Psychological 2 , sociological 3 and economic theories 4 suggest causal pathways to explain how the prevalence of rule violations in people's social environment, such as corruption, tax evasion or political fraud, can compromise individual intrinsic honesty. Here we present cross-societal experiments from 23 countries around the world that demonstrate a robust link between the prevalence of rule violations and intrinsic honesty. We developed an index of the 'prevalence of rule violations' (PRV) based on country-level data from the year 2003 of corruption, tax evasion and fraudulent politics. We measured intrinsic honesty in an anonymous die-rolling experiment 5 . We conducted the experiments with 2,568 young participants (students) who, due to their young age in 2003, could not have influenced PRV in 2003. We find individual intrinsic honesty is stronger in the subject pools of low PRV countries than those of high PRV countries. The details of lying patterns support psychological theories of honesty 6,7 . The results are consistent with theories of the cultural co-evolution of institutions and values 8 , and show that weak institutions and cultural legacies 9-11 that generate rule violations not only have direct adverse economic consequences, but might also impair individual intrinsic honesty that is crucial for the smooth functioning of society.
Ethical values, including honesty, are transmitted from prestigious people, peers and parents. People often take high-status individuals such as business leaders and celebrities as role models 21 , and their cheating can set bad examples for dishonest practices 19 . Similarly, if politicians set bad examples by using fraudulent tactics like rigging elections, nepotism and embezzlement, then the honesty of citizens might suffer, because corruption is fostered in wider parts of society 13 . If many people work in the shadow economy and thereby evade taxes, peer effects might make cheating more acceptable 22 . If corruption is endemic in society, parents may recommend a positive attitude towards corruption and other acts of dishonesty and rule violations as a way to succeed in such an environment 4, 23 .
To measure the extent of society-wide practices of rule violations we constructed the PRV index. We focused on three broad types of rule violations: political fraud, tax evasion and corruption. We constructed PRV by calculating the principal component of three widely used country-level variables that all rest on comprehensive, often representative data sources to capture the important dimensions of the prevalence of rule violations that we are interested in: an indicator of political rights by Freedom House that measures the democratic quality of a country's political practices; the size of a country's shadow economy as a proxy for tax evasion; and corruption as measured by the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (Supplementary Methods).
We constructed PRV for the 159 countries for which data are available for all three variables, the earliest year being 2003. We used the 2003 data to maximize the distance between the measurement of PRV and the point in time we ran the experiments (between 2011 and 2015, that is, at least 8 years after 2003). We use the 2003 data to ensure that our experimental participants could not have affected PRV in 2003 because they were still children at that time and therefore had been in no position to commit rule violations that influenced PRV in 2003. PRV in 2003 has a mean of 0 (s.d. = 1.46), and it ranges from −3.1 to 2.8 (higher values indicate higher prevalence of rule violations).
Our strategy was to conduct comparable experiments in 23 diverse countries with a distribution of PRV that resembles the world distribution of PRV. In the countries of our sample, PRV in 2003 ranges from −3.1 to 2.0, with a mean of −0.7 (s.d. = 1.52). Thus, the distribution of PRV in our sample is approximately representative of the world distribution of PRV with a slight bias towards lower PRV countries. The countries of our sample also vary strongly according to frequently used cultural indicators such as individualism and value orientations (Extended Data Table 1 and Supplementary Methods).
Our participants, all nationals of the respective country, were young people with comparable sociodemographic characteristics (students; mean age of 21.7 (s.d. = 3.3) years; 48% females; Supplementary Methods) who, due to their youth, had limited chances of being involved in political fraud, tax evasion or corruption, but might have been exposed to (or socialized into) certain attitudes towards (dis-) respecting rules 24 .
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for each subject pool. CDFs are far away from full dishonesty. CDFs are also bent away from full honesty and cluster around the justified dishonesty benchmark. One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for discrete data reject the null hypotheses of equality of CDFs with the full honesty benchmarks for every subject pool, but cannot reject the null hypothesis in 13 subject pools in comparisons with the justified dishonesty benchmark (Extended Data Fig. 2a ).
Deviations from the justified dishonesty benchmark are related to PRV. The CDFs of subject pools from low PRV countries tend to be above the CDF implied by justified dishonesty, and also above those of most high PRV countries. Comparing the distributions of claims pooled for all low and high PRV countries, respectively, reveals a highly significant difference (n low = 1,211, n high = 1,357; χ 2 (5) = 40.21, P < 0.001). The pooled CDF from high PRV countries first-order stochastically dominates the pooled CDF from low PRV countries, that is, subjects from low PRV countries are more honest than subjects from high PRV countries. The pooled CDF from low PRV countries also lies significantly above justified dishonesty (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d = 0.103, P < 0.001), whereas the pooled CDF from high PRV countries tends to be slightly below it (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, d = 0.058, P < 0.001; Extended Data Fig. 2b and Supplementary Information).
The inset in Fig. 1 illustrates the implications of these patterns in terms of average claims. Subjects from low PRV countries claim 3.17 money units (s.d. = 1.67), that is, 0.67 money units more than under full honesty. Subjects from high PRV countries claim 3.53 money units (s.d. = 1.49) or 1.03 money units more than under full honesty. This difference in claims is significant (t-test, t = 5.84, two-sided P < 0.001); it also holds at the country level (n = 23; Mann-Whitney test, z = 3.40, two-sided P < 0.001). Justified dishonesty implies an expected claim of 3.47 money units. The average claim in high PRV countries is not significantly different from this benchmark (one-sample t-test, n high = 1,357, t = 1.48, two-sided P = 0.140), but is significantly lower in low PRV countries (one-sample t-test, n low = 1,211, t = 6.35, twosided P < 0.001).
Next we looked at four measures of dishonesty that can be derived from our task (Supplementary Information) and related them to countrylevel PRV (Fig. 2) . A first measure of dishonesty is mean claim, which ranges from 2.96 money units to 3.96 money units across countries (mean = 3.32 money units, s.d. = 0.26; Kruskal-Wallis test, χ 2 (22) = 75.2, P < 0.001). PRV and mean claim are strongly positively related ( Fig. 2a) .
A second measure is the frequency of high claims for reported numbers 3, 4 and 5, which should occur at 50% if people are honest and at 75% under justified dishonesty. Frequencies range from 61.0% to 84.3% (mean = 71.8%, s.d. = 5.7%; χ 2 (22) = 45.0, P = 0.003). PRV and high claims are strongly positively associated (Fig. 2b) .
The incentive is to claim 5, irrespective of the number actually rolled. Thus, the fraction of income maximizers provides our third measure of dishonesty. It is estimated from the fraction of people who reported 5 (highest claim) minus the expected rate of actual rolls of 5 (16.7%). To account for income maximizers who actually rolled a 5, the difference has to be multiplied by 6/5 (ref. 5) . The rate of income maximizers ranges from 0.3% to 38.3% across subject pools (mean = 16.2%, s.d. = 9.4%; χ 2 (22) = 72.4, P < 0.001). Given that PRV captures rule violations for selfish gains and evidence suggesting rule breakers tend to be more selfish 25 , we predict that income maximizers is positively correlated with PRV. We find, however, that they are unrelated ( Fig. 2c ). Thus, a society's PRV does not systematically affect maximal cheating in this experiment.
This result is in contrast to the observation that the estimated fraction of fully honest people and PRV are significantly negatively related (Fig. 2d ). The fraction of fully honest people, our fourth measure, is estimated from 'no claim' , that is, reports of rolling 6. A report of 6 is most likely honest and honest reports can occur for all numbers. Therefore, the fraction of fully honest people can be estimated as the fraction of people reporting 6 multiplied by six. Across subject Our experimental tool to measure intrinsic honesty was the 'die-in-a-cup' task 5 . Participants sat in a cubicle and were asked to roll a six-sided die placed in an opaque cup twice, but to report the first roll only. Die rolling was unobservable by anyone except the subject (Extended Data Fig. 1 ). Participants were paid according to the number they reported. Reporting a one earned the participant one money unit, claiming a two earned two money units, and so on, except that reporting a six earned nothing. Participants understood that reports were unverifiable. Across countries, money units reflected local purchasing power (Supplementary Methods). Thus, incentives in the experiment are the same for everyone, whether they live in a high or low PRV environment.
Although individual dishonesty is not detectable, aggregate behaviour is informative. In an honest subject pool, all numbers occur with a probability of one-sixth and the average claim is 2.5 money units. We refer to this as the 'full honesty' benchmark. By contrast, in the 'full dishonesty' benchmark, subjects follow their material incentives and claim 5 money units.
The die-in-a-cup task requires only a simple non-strategic decision, and it allows for gradual dishonesty predicted by psychological theories of honesty 6, 7 . An experimentally tested theory of 'justified ethicality' 7 applied to our setting argues that many people have a desire to maintain an honest self-image. Lying about a die roll jeopardizes this self-image, but bending rules might not. Bending the rules is to report the higher of the two rolls, rather than the first roll as required. Reporting the better of two rolls implies the 'justified dishonesty' benchmark: claims of 0 should occur in 1/36 ≈ 2.8% of the cases (after rolling (6, 6) ); claims of 1 should occur in 3/36 ≈ 8.3% (after (6,1) or (1, 6) or (1,1)); claims of 2, 3, 4 and 5 should occur in 13.9%, 19.4%, 25% and 30.6% of cases, respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the benchmarks, presented as cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). Figure 1 also shows the empirical CDF Letter reSeArCH pools, fully honest people range from 4.3% to 87% (mean = 48.9%, s.d. = 21.3%; χ 2 (22) = 42.1, P = 0.006). In societies with high levels of PRV, fewer people are fully honest than in societies with low levels of PRV.
Regression analyses that control for individual attitudes to honesty and beliefs in the fairness of others, as well as for sociodemographics confirm the robustness of our results (Extended Data Table 2 and Supplementary Information). Sociodemographic variables, including gender, are generally insignificant. Stronger individual norms of honesty significantly reduce mean claim, high claim and highest claim. Beliefs in the fairness of others only significantly reduce highest claim.
Results are also robust using the earliest available data related to PRV, corruption in 1996; using 'Government Effectiveness' , a proxy for bureaucratic quality and material security 11 and measures of institutional quality that emphasize law enforcement (rules) and not actual compliance and which extend far into the past, so they are most likely not influenced even by parents (Extended Data Fig. 3a-d and Supplementary Information) .
Given that the experiment holds the rules and incentives constant for everyone, the large differences across subject pools are also consistent with a cultural transmission of norms of honesty and rule following through the generations 4,15,23 and a co-evolution of norms and institutions 8 . Societies with higher material security, as measured by Government Effectiveness, tend to be more individualist 11 , and more individualist societies tend to have less corruption 10 . Consistent with this, we find that subject pools from individualist societies have lower claims than subject pools from more collectivist societies and also from more traditional societies and societies with survival-related values (Extended Data Fig. 4a-c and Supplementary Information). Further econometric analyses developed in economic literature on culture and institutions 14 applied to PRV support the argument that both the quality of institutions, as well as culture (individualism) are highly significantly (and likely causally) correlated with PRV (Extended Data Table 3 and Supplementary Information) .
Taken together, our results suggest that institutions and cultural values influence PRV, which, through various theoretically predicted and experimentally tested pathways 2, 11, 16, 19, 20, [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , impact on people's intrinsic honesty and rule following. Our experiments from around the globe also provide support for arguments that for many people lying is psychologically costly [27] [28] [29] [30] . More specifically, theories of honesty posit that many people are either honest, or (self-deceptively 1 ) bend rules or lie gradually to an extent that is compatible with maintaining an honest self-image 6, 7 . Evidence for lying aversion and honest self-concepts has been mostly confined to western societies with low PRV values 30 . Our expanded scope of societies therefore provides important support and qualifications for the generalizability of these theories-people benchmark their justifiable dishonesty with the extent of dishonesty they see in their societal environment.
Online Content Methods, along with any additional Extended Data display items and Source Data, are available in the online version of the paper; references unique to these sections appear only in the online paper. 
Extended Data Figure 1 | The die-in-a-cup task. Experiment following Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 5 . Participants (n = 2,568 from 23 countries) were asked to roll the die twice in the cup and to report the first roll. Payment is according to reported roll, except that reporting a 6 earns 0 money units (across subject pools, money units in local currency are adjusted to equalize purchasing power). We used the same set of dice in all subject pools, and we also tested the dice for bias. The procedures followed established rules in cross-cultural experimental economics. See Supplementary Information for further details. This picture was taken by J.S. in the experimental laboratory of the University of Nottingham. Table 1 and Supplementary Information for data description, references and further analyses. 

Extended Data Table 3 | Institutional and cultural determinants of PrV
Dependent variable is PRV in 2003. Our approach follows recent advances in the economic literature on institutions and culture (see Supplementary Information for details and references). Models 1 to 6 are OLS; models 7 to 10 use instrumental variables to identify causal relations. All regressions control for legal origin (French, British, German, Scandinavian). Model 1 shows that both a frequently used measure for institutional quality (Constraint on Executive) and a frequently used measure for culture (Individualism) are significantly correlated with PRV. Model 2 shows that past institutional quality (Constraint on Executive in 1890-1900) can have long-lasting effects on PRV. Models 3 to 6 control for important variables proposed in the literature. Models 7 to 10 report the results from instrumental variable estimation (instrumented variables are in bold); the instruments are assumed to have no direct impact on PRV but only on the explanatory variable, and thereby allow identifying a causal effect of either institutions (as measured by Constraint on Executive) or culture (as measured by Individualism) on PRV. Model 7 instruments institution with 'settler mortality' in European colonies (1600-1875). To preserve degrees of freedom we do not include Individualism. Model 8 uses language (grammatical rules) and model 9 uses genetic distance as an instrument for culture. Model 10 uses both instruments. Models 7 to 10 suggest causal effects of both the quality of institutions and culture (Individualism) on PRV. *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
